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I. INTRODUCTION
Substantive changes in antitrust law since 1977 have had a dra-
matic impact on the vitality of antitrust enforcement.' Recent "proce-
dural" changes now seem likely to have as great an influence. In the
procedural area, the emphasis has been on antitrust standing and anti-
trust injury.2 As a result of recent judicial interpretations of these re-
quirements, antitrust plaintiffs face increasingly formidable hurdles. As
courts focus on questions of standing and injury, important discussions
about whether a practice should be held to a per se or rule of reason
standards frequently are immaterial. If there is no qualified plaintiff,
the substantive issue need never be addressed.
Technically, standing requirements limit the array of potential
plaintiffs while antitrust injury requirements limit the types of compen-
sable harms.4 Together, however, they form a generalized standing re-
quirement: a list of conditions a plaintiff must satisfy before qualifying
to proceed to the substantive antitrust question. The Supreme Court
neglected the issue until 1977.5 Since that time, the Court has consid-
ered the issue on five occasions.6 Despite this repeated analysis, the
Court has provided little guidance with respect to antitrust standing.
This lack of guidance can be traced to the Supreme Court's enunciation
of rather general guidelines and then applying those guidelines in sub-
stantive factual contexts that are not representative of most antitrust
litigation. Consequently, a division between circuits has emerged with
1. In 1977 the Supreme Court decided Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977), removing nonprice vertical restraints on distribution from its category of per se illegal
practices. In so doing, the Court entered an era of antitrust adjudication in which economic consid-
erations were to play a dominant role. Earlier indications of a changing methodology are found in
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). See generally Posner, The Rule
of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1977).
2. Since 1977 the Court has addressed the standing or injury issue six times. See infra text
accompanying notes 21-86.
3. In its purest form, the per se standard means that no analysis of individual competitive
impact is necessary because certain activities are deemed to work so often in an anticompetitive
fashion. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). Under the
rule of reason standard, an activity is found to violate the antitrust laws when the actual impact on
competition is weighed and determined to be negative on balance. This standard evolved from
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
4. See T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICA-
TIONS 39-45 (1988).
5. The seminal work documenting pre-1977 judicial treatment is Berger & Bernstein, An An-
alytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977); see also Comment, A Fare-
well to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble
Damages Actions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 437 (1984).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 21-100.
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respect to the status of different classes of antitrust plaintiffs.'
Procedural changes may seem merely to alter the universe of quali-
fied plaintiffs, but a closer examination reveals that this impression is
misleading.8 Our first purpose is to demonstrate that the antitrust in-
jury requirement is so elastic that it can be interpreted effectively to
alter substantive antitrust law. This substantive alteration may seem to
have desirable consequences in some cases. For example, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in sharp contrast with the Ninth
Circuit and held that a seller injured by a scheme fixing a maximum
resale price has suffered no antitrust injuryY The result of the Seventh
Circuit's ruling essentially is to make vertical maximum resale price fix-
ing per se lawful. This result is consistent with most recent scholarly
analysis,10 but is inconsistent with the continuing view of the Supreme
Court that such arrangements are unlawful." In other instances, how-
ever, a trend seems to be emerging in which the antitrust injury re-
quirement undermines the pursuit of substantive values that the
antitrust laws are designed to further. Even those who stress narrow
economic objectives for antitrust law and believe the primary purpose
of damage awards to be deterrence rather than compensation should be
concerned with the potential effects of recent antitrust injury
interpretations.
2
7. Compare Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the mere presence of a substantive Sherman Act § 1 violation, whether per se or not,
does not by itself bestow on any plaintiff a private right of action) and Jack Walters & Sons Corp.
v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.) (stating that to have standing to bring an antitrust
action, it is not enough that the plaintiff would not have been injured but for the defendant's
alleged violation of the antitrust laws; the injury must be of the type that the antitrust laws are
intended to forbid), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) with USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that injury done to the market and to competitors
by price fixing is the type of injury that the antitrust laws were meant to prevent), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 2446 (1989).
8. This phenomenon is not restricted to antitrust law. See, e.g., Ingber, Procedure, Cere-
mony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control, 56 B.U.L. REv.
266 (1976); Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635
(1985).
9. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Jack Walters can be factually distinguished from the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in USA Petroleum in that the former concerned terminated dealers while
the latter concerned independent competitors. Any possibility that this factual distinction could
lead to a substantive reconciliation of the approaches used by the courts was eliminated by the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Indiana Grocery, a case factually similar to USA Petroleum. See
supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare: An Economic
Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461 (1981); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
886 (1981).
11. Vertical agreements fixing maximum resale prices are per se unlawful under Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
12. We do not intend to summarize the various goals that are suggested for antitrust law nor
the justifications for them. Those who stress narrow economic objectives believe that the primary
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Our second purpose is to propose an antitrust injury standard that
is consistent with the substantive ends of antitrust law. The policy issue
of what should be regarded as antitrust injury is addressed, not whether
a particular harm fits within any current formulation of antitrust in-
jury. Most of the commentary to date has presented a "Chicago" view,13
focusing on allocative efficiency. 14 Permeating the Chicago view is an
inordinate concern that an expansive view of antitrust injury will
"overdeter" in that it will lead businesses away from efficiency enhanc-
ing practices that incorrectly may be deemed antitrust violations.'5
There is little doubt that some antitrust rules can lead to incorrect re-
sults, but that problem stems from the substantive rules and should be
addressed accordingly.
The premise for our approach is the economic concept of Pareto
optimality.'" The theme of our proposal is that a plaintiff has suffered
antitrust injury whenever the injury is a necessary consequence of an
act that is part of a plan that would harm consumers. We propose a
two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff has suffered antitrust in-
jury as we define it. First, we would ask whether there is a logical con-
nection between the challenged activity and a decrease in the welfare of
consumers.' 7 If the answer is yes, we would then ask whether the dam-
age to the plaintiff is a necessary consequence of the activity. If it is,
aims of antitrust law should be to enhance consumer welfare or allocative efficiency. For a discus-
sion of antitrust goals, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50-71
(1978); T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, supra note 4, at 2-6; Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67
(1982).
The issue of whether antitrust damages should be awarded in a manner that deters anticom-
petitive conduct or compensates victims is related to the issue of antitrust goals. See generally W.
BREIT & K. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONoMIc ANALYSIS (1986). For a contrasting
view, see Blair, Antitrust Penalties: Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 57 (1980).
With implicit Supreme Court encouragement, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977),
the emphasis in antitrust scholarship has been on the deterrence function. See, e.g., Easterbrook,
Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1985); Page, Antitrust Damages and Eco-
nomic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980).
13. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 95 (1986); Easterbrook, supra
note 12; Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445 (1985); Page,
supra note 12.
14. The Chicago School commentators, however, evidently are not equally concerned with all
allocative inefficiencies. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 279 (1981).
15. See Page, supra note 13, at 1452-53.
16. For an explanation of Pareto optimality, see infra text accompanying notes 188-89.
17. In the case of per se offenses, the answer to the first question should be an automatic
"yes." This position stems from deference to Supreme Court precedent holding that "agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal . . . " Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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then the plaintiff should be viewed as having suffered an antitrust
injury.
The Supreme Court's recent emphasis on antitrust standing and
injury will be examined in Part 11.18 In Part III we examine four areas
of antitrust concern: vertical maximum price fixing, resale price mainte-
nance, predation, and collusive monopsony. As already noted, in the
context of maximum vertical price fixing, the circuits are in direct disa-
greement with respect to the proper interpretation of antitrust injury.19
In the other three areas, interpretations are beginning to emerge that
could work to eliminate or greatly reduce private action that is consis-
tent with modern antitrust goals. In Part IV we demonstrate how our
approach is consistent with substantive antitrust goals. In Part V we
conclude by reiterating the value of the test we have developed.
II. ANTITRUST STANDING AND INJURY
A. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.2 °
The modern era of antitrust standing and injury began in 1977
with Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. In Brunswick the
plaintiff charged that Brunswick, a manufacturer of bowling equipment,
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act 1 by acquiring several failing bowl-
ing "centers. 2 2 The plaintiff, a competitor of the acquired centers, of-
fered as a substantive theory that the presence of the large
manufacturing firm in the bowling center market could "substantially
lessen competition" as the smaller competitors were driven from the
market.23 The damages were identified as the profit that the plaintiff
would have made if the failing bowling centers had closed. 4
The Supreme Court did not focus on the substantive question of
whether the effect of the acquisition was "substantially to lessen com-
petition" under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 5 The Court instead re-
viewed the remedial question involving an interpretation of section 4 of
the Clayton Act, which provides for treble damages for "any person
who shall be injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
18. Although the focus of this Article is on antitrust injury, these two requirements are so
closely related that they are better understood when considered together.
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). See generally Comment, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and
the Per Se Standard, 93 YALE L.J. 1309 (1984) (discussing early standing decisions).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
22. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 480.
23. Id. at 481.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 485 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
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trust laws."2' 6 The question for the Court was not whether the acquisi-
tion violated section 7, nor was it whether the plaintiff had suffered
some sort of injury as a result of this entry. The Court focused on the
question of whether the injury claimed was "'by reason of' that which
made the acquisitions unlawful. '2 7
The Court answered its principal question negatively, finding that
the plaintiff's claim for lost profit was not due to injuries incurred "by
reason of' a forbidden act. The plaintiff's loss, the Court noted, would
be the same regardless of the size or power of a new entrant into the
market.2" More generally, the plaintiff's injury was due to an increase in
competition that kept it from acquiring market power itself. The Court
defined "antitrust injury . . . [as] the type the antitrust laws were in-
tended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defend-
ants' acts unlawful."2 9 The plaintiff's alleged loss was linked to
increased competition in the bowling center market but not to any
predatory conduct.30 Accordingly, Pueblo demonstrated no antitrust in-
jury as a result of Brunswick's acquisitions.
B. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois31
The Court responded to what was more clearly a standing issue
later in the same Term. Illinois Brick was the judicial offspring of Han-
over Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,32 a 1968 case in which
the Court held that a defendant may not reduce the damages associated
with an alleged overcharge by demonstrating that the plaintiff has
passed on part of the overcharge to subsequent purchasers. 3
Illinois Brick addressed the corollary question of whether a plain-
tiff may use the pass-on theory to collect damages from a firm from
which it has not made a direct purchase. The Court first noted that
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
27. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
28. Id. at 487 & n.11 (citing Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130-36 (1976)).
29. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 490. The Court suggested that "competition" carried too far, as in the case of
predatory pricing, would give rise to an "antitrust injury." Id. n.15. Here, however, the plaintiff
linked no losses to below-cost pricing of the defendant. Id. n.16.
31. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
32. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
33. Id. at 489. See generally Harris & Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A
Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979) (arguing that a court could deal with
allocating the overcharge among multiple plaintiffs in a vertical claim); Landes & Posner, The
Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980) (dis-
agreeing with the position taken by Harris and Sullivan); Snyder, Efficient Assignment of Rights
to Sue for Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 469 (1985) (analyzing how the legal rules assigning
treble-damages rights affect the number of private antitrust suits).
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consistency required it to deny the action unless Hanover Shoe were
overruled.34 Permitting the pass-on theory for offensive purposes but
not for defensive purposes would create the possibility of multiple lia-
bility. 5 Thus, the Court worked from the premise that the rules regard-
ing passed-on overcharges should be the same for plaintiffs and
defendants.
Whether to change the judicial approach to the pass-on theory and
make it available for both offensive and defensive use was the more
general issue before the Court. The Court ruled against use of the the-
ory and denied standing to indirect purchasers.3 6 It is important to note
that the issue was not whether indirect purchasers had suffered an "an-
titrust injury. '3 7 Certainly they had in that the overcharge is the logical
and direct consequence of a price fixing arrangement. Instead, the
Court's concern was less technical and more policy oriented; it ad-
dressed whether there were good reasons for construing section 4 of the
Clayton Act as excluding indirect purchasers from the pool of potential
plaintiffs. 8 The primary rationale offered by the Court for excluding
indirect purchasers was the complexity likely to result from efforts to
apportion an overcharge among various levels of direct and indirect
purchasers.3" The Court noted that, although economic theory offers
methods of making the apportionment, such apportionment was not ju-
dicially manageable. 0
The six Justice majority argued that its decision furthered the in-
terests of using the treble damage action as a deterrent.4' They rea-
soned that an attenuated process of apportioning damages would
decrease the incentive to sue by lowering the stakes for any potential
"private attorney general" while increasing litigation expenses. 4 The
Court acknowledged that, to some extent, the decision subordinated the
compensatory function of section 4 to the goal of deterrence.43
34. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729.
35. Id. at 729-36.
36. Id. at 736.
37. The Court did not consider the "by reason of" language of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
38. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737-41.
39. Id. at 740-41.
40. Id. at 742. The methods of making the necessary apportionment depend upon numerous
simplifying assumptions that are not likely to mirror reality. Id. at 741.
41. Id. at 745-46.
42. Id. at 745.
43. Id. at 746.
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C. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp."
The Court addressed antitrust injury in the context of a price dis-
crimination charge in 1981.45 In J. Truett Payne a Chrysler-Plymouth
automobile dealer alleged injury from Chrysler's price discrimination. 6
The plaintiff asked for damages equal to the amount that it was
charged for automobiles above the price charged to competing dealers.41
The Court framed the issue as the appropriate measure of damages in a
suit brought under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act.48
The Court rejected the claim for "automatic damages" equal to the
amount of the discriminatory overcharge.49 It reasoned that Brunswick
required treating the issue of damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act as a separate matter from the issue of a substantive violation." The
Court then compared the language of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,
which permits a plaintiff to prevail on the substantive issue by showing
that the discrimination may lessen competition, with that of section 4
of the Act, which requires a showing of actual harm.51 According to the
Court, "proof of a violation does not mean that a disfavored purchaser
has been actually 'injured' within the meaning of § 4.''52 In a single step,
the Court applied antitrust injury to hold that a showing of actual in-
jury was required and that the overcharge was not a satisfactory mea-
sure of the injury.
The Court devoted much of its opinion to the issue of whether the
plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence at the trial court level from
which a jury could make a reasonable inference about the amount of
damage.5 3 In short, the Court addressed the issues of antitrust in-
jury-the type of injury-and the evidence required to show the quan-
tum of injury. This distinction is important, because presumably a
plaintiff who has suffered the right type of harm but is unable to show
the amount of injury with some degree of certainty still would be eligi-
ble for injunctive relief.5 4 It is also worth noting that in J. Truett Payne
44. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
45. Id. at 559. The claim was brought under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1982).
46. J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 559-60.
47. Id. at 561.
48. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act makes it un-
lawful for a seller to "discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality. . . where the effect. . . may be substantially to lessen competition." 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1982); see T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, supra note 4, at 316-30.
49. J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 561-63.
50. Id. at 562.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 563-68.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 87-100.
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the Court said nothing to suggest that it was not continuing the long-
standing policy of holding antitrust victims to a very low evidentiary
standard on the issue of the amount of harm.5
D. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready5
The Court addressed the issue of antitrust standing again in 1982.
In McCready the plaintiff's employer provided the plaintiff with health
insurance.5 7 The contract provided that the plaintiff would be reim-
bursed for treatment by a psychiatrist but not for treatment by a psy-
chologist unless the psychologist was supervised by a physician.5 8 The
plaintiff alleged that the reimbursement of psychologists was excluded
from coverage as a result of an anticompetitive pact between Blue Cross
and the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia.59 The refusal of Blue
Cross to provide reimbursement for the services of psychologists caused
the actual injury. 0
The Court distinguished its analysis from that in Illinois Brick, in-
dicating that the question of multiple liability was absent in
McCready." Instead, the Court framed the McCready standing issue in
terms of how remote the plaintiff may be before falling outside the
scope of section 4's coverage.62 Analogizing the question to one of deter-
mining "proximate cause," the Court announced that it would look:
(1) to the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm
to the plaintiff, and (2) . . . to the relationship of the injury alleged with those
forms of injury about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making
defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy under § 4. 3
The first question apparently dealt with the issue of antitrust standing
while the second focused on a Brunswick-type antitrust injury issue.
With respect to the issue of remoteness, the Court emphasized that the
plaintiff, although neither a competitor nor literally a consumer, was a
foreseeable and necessary victim of the reimbursement agreement. The
harm, thus, was not so fortuitous or incidental as to fall outside the
protection of section 4.64
55. J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 465-67 (discussing Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U.S. 251 (1946)); see Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement
Cases, 64 MINN. L. REv. 751, 756-58 (1980).
56. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
57. Id. at 467-68.
58. Id. at 468.
59. Id. at 469-71.
60. Id. at 470.
61. Id. at 473-75.
62, Id. at 476.
63. Id. at 478.
64. Id. at 478-80.
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On the issue of antitrust injury, the defendant sought to invoke
Brunswick, arguing that the plaintiff had not paid elevated rates for
psychiatric services, the market supposedly benefiting from the agree-
ment. 5 Nor had the plaintiff claimed that her psychologist's bills were
higher than they would have been but for the agreement.6  Thus, she
had not suffered the type of injury generally associated with an an-
ticompetitive effort. The Court, however, ruled that those potential
damages did not exhaust the section 4 possibilities.6 7 In this instance,
the plaintiff could seek the services of a psychiatrist, in which case the
anticompetitive impact would have been felt by psychologists, or she
could make use of a psychologist and forgo reimbursement.68 The plain-
tiff chose the latter route, leading to a higher net cost of psychological
services e.6 The Court held these higher net costs to be "inextricably in-
tertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on
psychologists. '7 0
E. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters (AGC) 1
In the following Term, the Court attempted to clarify McCready
and offered its most comprehensive examination of antitrust standing.
In AGC the plaintiff union charged that a multiemployer builder's asso-
ciation coerced members and nonmember landowners and subcontrac-
tors to hire nonunion labor.7 2 The union claimed twenty-five million
dollars in damages as a result of the effort designed to "weaken, de-
stroy, and restrain the trade of certain contractors. 173 The union did
not couch its complaint in terms of lower demand for union labor and
resultant lower wages or financial losses to the union itself. 4 The Court
generally viewed the union as an independent business-like entity
rather than as a group of sellers of labor.75 Moreover, the Court viewed
the market in which the coercion was alleged to have taken place as
65. Id. at 481-82.
66. Id. at 481.
67. Id. at 482-84; see Maurer, Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready: The Limits of the Anti-
trust Injury Doctrine, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 67 (1984).
68. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483.
69. Id. at 483-84.
70. Id. at 484.
71. 459 U.S. 519 (1983); see Note, More Trouble with Treble: The Effects of McCready and
Associated General Contractors on the Antitrust Standing Opinions of the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals, 10 J. CORP. L. 463 (1985); Note, Private Antitrust Standing: A Survey and Analysis of the
Law After Associated General, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1069 (1984).
72. AGC, 459 U.S. at 522.
73. Id. at 523.
74. Id. at 542.
75. Id. at 541 & n.46; see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 334.1b (Supp. 1988).
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being made up of building contractors and subcontractors."
The Court applied a series of steps in determining that the union
suffered no injury in its business or property by anything forbidden by
the antitrust laws. 7 The Court first examined the nature of the plain-
tiff's alleged injury.78 Here, the Court applied Brunswick and appar-
ently incorporated an antitrust injury requirement into the general
question of antitrust standing. With respect to the injury, the Court
indicated that the union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in
the relevant market.79 In addition, it reasoned that as an economic mat-
ter there was no clear indication what the impact of increased competi-
tion in the relevant market would be on the union membership.80 In
effect, the union failed to link its injury to the antitrust goal of increas-
ing competition.8 1
The question whether the union had actually incurred any damage
was a related, but evidently separate, issue addressed by the Court.2
The Court focused not on the conceptual notion of antitrust injury nor
on speculation as to the actual amount of damage. Instead, the Court
indicated that the union failed to specify the way in which it, as op-
posed to its members, was harmed. 3 The Court also examined the di-
rectness of the alleged injury. According to the Court, the initial impact
of the alleged violative practice would fall on those contractors, land-
owners, and subcontractors who were coerced.8 4 The Court indicated
that the presence of a group of direct victims made it unlikely that a
serious antitrust violation would go undetected. 5 This presence of di-
rect victims diminished the need to permit the union to act as a private
attorney general. Finally, the Court invoked the policy of Illinois Brick
and explained that to permit the union to proceed could result in multi-
ple liability and a complex process of apportioning damages.8"
F. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc."
In 1986 the Court returned to the issue of antitrust injury in the
context of a plaintiff who requested an injunction under section 16 of
76. AGC, 459 U.S. at 541.
77. Id. at 521.
78. Id. at 538.
79. Id, at 539.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 539-40.
82. Id. at 542-43.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 542.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 544-45.
87. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
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the Clayton Act."" The plaintiff sought to block a merger of two of its
competitors.89 Section 16 provides for injunctive relief when there is a
"threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws."90 In
this instance, the plaintiff was a beef packer who bought beef cattle,
slaughtered them, and sold fabricated beef.91 The plaintiff anticipated
"a price-cost squeeze" after the merger: higher costs for cattle and
lower prices for fabricated beef.2
The issues before the Court were whether section 16 required a
showing of antitrust injury and whether the type of injury alleged by
the plaintiff met this requirement. The Court held that sections 4 and
16 should be read in parallel fashion. Because section 4 required a
showing of antitrust injury, section 16 required a showing that the
plaintiff was threatened with an antitrust injury9 3
The Court then reviewed and rejected two arguments the plaintiff
presented to support having suffered an antitrust injury. The first the-
ory was that the defendant would lower its prices to a point just above
its cost, thereby decreasing the profits of the plaintiff.94 In response to
this theory, the Court relied on Brunswick and reasoned that lost prof-
its due to increased competition did not constitute the type of
threatened harm that would invoke the protection of section 16.11
The second theory was that the defendant could engage in preda-
tory pricing thereby forcing the plaintiff from the market.96 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon this theory when it affirmed the
district court's grant of the injunction. 7 The Court responded to the
Tenth Circuit's affirmation by noting that the lower court was vague
about what it regarded as predatory pricing. 8 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the plaintiff failed to assert at the district court level that
the defendant would engage in predatory conduct after the merger or
that its potential injury would be the result of below-cost pricing.9
While holding that the plaintiff did not show the potential for antitrust
injury, the Court expressly left open the possibility that a competitor
who challenges an acquisition may pass the section 16 antitrust injury
88. Id. at 105.
89. Id. at 107.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
91. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 106.
92. Id. at 108.
93. Id. at 113.
94. Id. at 114-15.
95. Id. at 117.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 118.
98. Id. at 118. For example, if the lower court defined as predatory any price below that of
the plaintiff, that was not predation but acceptable competition. Id.
99. Id. at 119.
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test by alleging that the new firm is likely to engage in predatory
conduct.10
G. Supreme Court Guidelines
Some general observations on the issue of antitrust standing and
injury are possible even though Supreme Court guidance remains
vague. A party must satisfy two basic tests. First, the plaintiff must
allege an injury that has flowed from anticompetitive activity.'0 ' Sec-
ond, the plaintiff must not be affected too remotely. Judgment on this
second factor will depend on the presence of more directly affected
plaintiffs who normally would be expected to bring suit, the risk of mul-
tiple liability, and the complexity of the damage allocation.'02 Whether
these two tests are viewed as components of a general test for antitrust
standing or as separate tests with the first addressing antitrust injury
and the second addressing antitrust standing is functionally
inconsequential.
The Court is scrupulous about not becoming enmeshed in two
questions that are part of a complete antitrust claim. The first is the
substantive question whether the alleged practice violates the antitrust
laws. In Cargill, for example, the Court declined a request by the De-
partment of Justice that it use that case to announce that a predatory
pricing theory can never be used by competitors of merging firms to
establish standing.10 3 Second, the Court, particularly in J. Truett Payne
Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., makes it clear that proof of the quantum
of damages is a different issue than proof of antitrust injury, antitrust
standing, and antitrust liability. When applying the "substantial evi-
dence" test to proof of damages, courts are quite lenient in permitting
the issue of amount of damage to reach the jury. 04 Nothing in the re-
cent discussions of antitrust injury suggests a change in this policy.
Despite this clarity in the Court's antitrust rulings, the Court's gen-
eral lack of direction has led to inconsistent outcomes among lower
courts. The injury requirement is more problematic than the Court's
enunciated standing guidelines. By necessity, the standing guidelines
must entail some weighing of various policies. The Court's direction
that antitrust injury must be of the right type and must flow from an-
ticompetitive action'0 5 has failed as a formula for lower courts. Two
100. Id. at 121.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 71-86.
103. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121.
104. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1981); see also
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969).
105. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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questions have emerged. First, should a lower court interpret per se of-
fenses so as to create automatic antitrust injury for those most directly
affected?108 Second, has a party suffered antitrust injury when its losses
flow from pressures that force it to lower prices?
III. ANTITRUST INJURY IN SUBSTANTIVE CONTEXTS
A successful private antitrust claimant must clear three hurdles se-
quentially. First, the plaintiff must satisfy the standing and injury re-
quirements. Second, the plaintiff must establish liability.107 Finally, the
plaintiff in an action for damages must satisfy the relatively low eviden-
tiary standard with respect to the actual amount of damage.
The lack of clarity offered by the Supreme Court in determining
antitrust injury makes it exceedingly difficult to keep procedural issues
from blending with substantive ones. This lack of clarity also gives rise
to two related and potentially more dangerous problems. First, inter-
pretations of the Supreme Court's vague antitrust injury standard can
result in decreased substantive clarity; judicial interpretations of sub-
stantive rules may vary from circuit to circuit. Second, there is a danger
that antitrust injury interpretations will undercut established antitrust
goals and the deterrence function of antitrust damage awards.
Here we examine vertical maximum price fixing, resale price main-
tenance (RPM), predation, and collusive monopsony. In the first two
instances, conflicting substantive rules already have emerged as a result
of varying antitrust injury interpretations. The potential for the same
inconsistency exists in the cases of predatory pricing and collusive mo-
nopsony. In the cases of RPM, predatory pricing, and collusive monop-
sony the possibility emerges that substantive antitrust objectives will
not be met. First, however, we turn to vertical maximum resale pricing
agreements. The problem here is not so much whether narrow interpre-
tations of antitrust injury defeat accepted antitrust aims. Instead, the
problem is that the vagueness of the injury requirement has permitted
the emergence of what are inconsistent substantive rules.
A. Vertical Maximum Price Fixing: The Curious Case of Albrecht
Under the Albrecht rule, vertical agreements that fix maximum re-
sale prices are per se unlawful.108 This rule seems to many to be incon-
sistent with modern antitrust goals. The days of the Albrecht rule
106. As noted earlier, see supra note 17 and accompanying text, we believe that proper def-
erence to the Supreme Court requires that this be answered affirmatively. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 186-90.
107. Depending on the claim, the standard may be rule of reason or per se.
108. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
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appeared numbered after Continental T. V., Inc, v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.10 Sylvania moved nonprice vertical restraints on distribution from
per se to rule of reason status. The rationale of Sylvania is that
procompetitive effects may follow from permitting manufacturers to al-
locate exclusive territories or customers to individual resellers. 1"0 In ef-
fect, the decrease in intrabrand competitioli that would follow from this
allocation of exclusive territories or customers frequently would be off-
set by increases in interbrand competition."" The procompetitive po-
tential, of course, is endangered if the reseller is free to take advantage
of its exclusivity by raising prices and restricting output. Albrecht thus
seems like an impediment to a full flowering of Sylvania. Indeed, a
strong case can be made that the Albrecht rule is inconsistent with vir-
tually every credible goal of antitrust, modern or otherwise." 2 Notwith-
standing its seeming inconsistency with Sylvania and disapproval from
virtually every quarter, Albrecht has persisted and possibly was
strengthened by recent Supreme Court citation."'
The controversy over the Albrecht rule now has surfaced in the
context of antitrust injury. At least one circuit overruled Albrecht
through the antitrust injury requirement while another circuit expressly
declined such an opportunity. The first approach can be found, not sur-
prisingly, in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In a 1984 opinion
authored by Judge Richard Posner, Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v.
Morton Building, Inc.,"4 a dealer in building materials charged that a
manufacturer had effectively set maximum resale prices. The court held
that even if the alleged unlawful price fixing did occur, the plaintiff did
not suffer an antitrust injury." 5 According to Judge Posner, even if the
agreement were unlawful its effect was to force the plaintiff to lower
prices, a practice the antitrust laws were meant to encourage."16 The
court left open the possibility of a different outcome if the resale price
were below cost." 7
Judge Posner's rationale presumably holds for a dealer who reluc-
tantly goes along with resale prices that are lower than he prefers.
109. 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price
Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1978).
110. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55.
111. The Sylvania Court expressly declined to change the status of vertical price restraints
although it specifically did not address vertical maximum price fixing. See id. at 51 n.18.
112. See Blair & Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 43, 43 (1986).
113. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346-48 (1982).
114. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
115. Id. at 708.
116. Id. at 709.
117. Id.
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Under this scenario, the damages again are the result of an inability to
raise prices.11 The purchaser also presumably is ruled out. A purchaser
could not show harm in terms of higher prices or lower short-run profits
because they are logical impossibilities. The approach of Judge Posner
thus seems to eliminate all likely plaintiffs including, ironically, the
plaintiff in Albrecht itself.
At one level, Jack Walters exposes the activist nature of Judge
Posner's approach to his judicial role. This reaction, however, may be
too simplistic. In many respects, Judge Posner's reasoning makes per-
fect sense: a firm that complains about the harm it suffered from com-
petition with another firm charging a fixed maximum resale price is
really claiming that it was unable to raise prices. Except in the context
of predatory prices, it is difficult to see how one could argue that the
antitrust laws were designed to protect any business from restraints on
its ability to raise prices.119
One, however, could argue that Judge Posner applied an unneces-
sarily narrow standard to the injury question. In Jack Walters he de-
clined to address the longer-run possibility that maximum prices, even
if not set at predatory levels, may eliminate competitors and lessen
competition. From one point of view, this omission raises at least an
empirical question that, correctly or incorrectly, the Supreme Court can
be interpreted as effectively having answered by establishing the per se
rule. If Judge Posner recognized this empirical question, one would pre-
sume that he would be required to recognize the answer provided by
the Supreme Court. Instead, Judge Posner seems to have carved out
enough of the substantive issue-the short-run direct impact on deal-
ers-to support his decision.
In a decision to be reviewed this Term by the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected the views of Judge
Posner. In USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 120 the plaintiff,
an independent retailer of gasoline, charged a manufacturer and its
dealers with fixing resale price at "below-market levels. 1' 2 The plaintiff
evidently did not allege that the prices were predatory, and the Ninth
Circuit defined the issue as "whether a competitor's injuries resulting
from vertical, non-predatory, maximum price fixing fall within the cate-
118. The economic effect of vertical maximum price fixing is to prevent the exercise of mo-
nopoly power. If the restraint is binding, then the plaintiff alleges lost profits because it could not
raise prices above the allowed maximum. See generally Blair & Kaserman, supra note 10; Easter-
brook, supra note 10. Professors Philip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp conclude that "[t]he
reduction in the plaintiff's price-cost margin is not an injury to competition." P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, 1 340.3b.
119. See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989).
120. 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 2446 (1989).
121. Id. at 689.
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gory of 'antitrust injury.' "122 The court held that the plaintiff alleged
an antitrust injury. 123 The court's reasoning proceeded at two levels. At
a general level, the Ninth Circuit cited repeated adherence of the Su-
preme Court to the substantive rule prohibiting maximum price fixing
and seemed to seek an interpretation of antitrust injury that would be
consistent with the substantive prohibition. To do otherwise, the court
indicated, would be to suggest that Brunswick had overruled Al-
brecht.12 4 In essence, the court sought to achieve this reconciliation by
suggesting an "automatic" antitrust injury in the case of price fixing.
Thus, "the injury done . . . by price-fixing conspiracies is antitrust
injury.' 25
On a more specific level, the court relied on the plaintiff's allega-
tion that the long-run effect of the challenged agreements could be to
eliminate retail competitors. 12 The court recognized that antitrust laws
were designed to protect "competition, not competitors.'' 2 7 It added,
however, that protecting competitors is a means of protecting competi-
tion in some instances. 128 Using a long-run perspective, the court sug-
gested that the elimination of retail sellers in a context in which reentry
was unlikely could lessen competition. The injury thus flowed from an
illegal effort to reduce competition.'
The Ninth Circuit's approach seems superior to that of the Seventh
Circuit in that it is marked by appropriate deference to the Supreme
Court's position on vertical maximum price fixing. That deference is
both express and reflected by the manner in which the court reconciled
the substantive rule with the antitrust injury requirement. In fairness,
122. Id.
123. Id. at 697.
124. Id. at 693 n.5.
125. Id. at 697. The court appears to rely heavily on Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), which was a horizontal price fixing case. Horizontal agreements raise
different issues than those raised by vertical maximum resale price agreements; therefore, this
reliance may be misplaced.
126. USA Petroleum, 859 F.2d at 699.
127. Id. at 695 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962)).
128. Id. at 695-96.
129. Id. at 696-97. The long-run concern is not obvious. Under traditional concepts of effi-
ciency and under the proper conditions, rivals cannot be excluded in the long-run by fixing maxi-
mum resale prices unless they are relatively inefficient. The implications of this conclusion may
differ, however, if one either does not accept efficiency as the only goal of antitrust or if one takes a
broader view of what is efficient. See Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1982) (discussing the possibility of taking a broader view of effi-
ciency); see also Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Re-
straints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust
Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125 (1987).
The most recent salvo in the debate between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits can be found in
Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989).
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though, this reconciliation may well have been motivated in part by
more than deference. The discussion of the majority reflects a strong
general agreement with the substantive rule.""0 Judge Posner made no
effort to effectuate such a reconciliation. He illustrated a more utilita-
rian orientation and perhaps was driven by a conviction that the sub-
stantive rule itself is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law. 1' The
division between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits is probably at least as
much about the Albrecht rule itself as it is about antitrust injury."12
Clearly, the time is right for the Supreme Court to address Albrecht
itself.133 Unfortunately, because the current battle is waged in "code" of
a very elastic concept of antitrust injury, it remains to be seen whether
we have moved toward a substantive reconsideration of Albrecht.
B. Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price maintenance (RPM) has provided another context for
judicial activism designed to respond to a seemingly outmoded substan-
tive rule. The Seventh Circuit has been the leader in arriving at innova-
tive interpretations of the antitrust injury requirement in this context.
It has considered cases involving dealers terminated for price cutting
and dealers who adhered to minimum prices.
In Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc.' the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered whether a purchaser who was selling at low prices to
discounters suffered antitrust injury when terminated. The terminated
reseller prayed for damages equal to the profits lost when its supplies
were cut off,135 a measure recognized by other circuits. 36 The court, in
an opinion written by Judge Walter Cummings, held that the plaintiff
suffered no antitrust injury. It reasoned that the success of the dis-
counting operation depended on the success of the alleged resale price
maintenance arrangement. 137 In essence, the plaintiff's profit was made
possible by the price umbrella provided by the conforming dealers, that
is, by the antitrust violation itself. Rather than suffering because of a
130. USA Petroleum, 859 F.2d at 696.
131. See Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014, 1026-28. For an
economic analysis of the Albrecht rule demonstrating that it is inconsistent with antitrust goals,
see Blair & Fesmire, supra note 112. For insight into Judge Posner's basically utilitarian leanings,
see R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
132. This seems supported by the view expressed by the Seventh Circuit more recently in
Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1417-19.
133. For an analysis of why it is so difficult to get Albrecht reconsidered, see Blair & Schafer,
Antitrust Law and Evolutionary Models of Legal Change, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 379 (1988).
134. 787 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 1199.
136. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985).
137. Local Beauty, 787 F.2d at 1202.
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lack of competition, the plaintiff incurred injury because it could no
longer "free ride" on the RPM, advertising, and promotional efforts of
other dealers. The court found that increased competition in this mar-
ket would be to the detriment of the plaintiff.13
More recently, the Seventh Circuit in Isaksen v. Vermont Castings,
Inc.3 9 considered a situation in which the plaintiff was a dealer who
unwillingly acquiesced in the manufacturer's demands to adhere to a
minimum price. The court, in a decision written by Judge Posner, held
that the reluctant dealer who nonetheless adhered to the minimum
price schedule may have suffered antitrust injury. 40 These damages, ac-
cording to the court, were equal to the "harassment [and] pun-
ish[ment]" used to enforce the price floor and "any profits, not due to
free riding," that were lost during the period of higher prices.' This
distinction is critical: unlike the problem in Local Beauty, the plain-
tiff's problem in Isaksen was in showing the actual amount of harm, not
in showing antitrust injury.'42
The court continued to explain the relevance of the "free-rider"
problem to the issue of measuring damages. The plaintiff's damage
model compared the profit earned while adhering to the price restric-
tion with that earned when it did not adhere to the price minimum.
The damage alleged was equal to the difference. 4 a Judge Posner
pointed out that at least some of the profit earned when the restriction
was not observed resulted from "taking a free ride on other dealers,
who provided valuable point-of-sale services."' 44 That portion of the
lost profit was not recoverable. Accordingly, "[tihe prevention of free
riding is not. . . a defense to a charge of resale price maintenance; but
neither is being prevented from taking a free ride on another dealer's
efforts a form of antitrust injury.' 45
Although the Seventh Circuit opinions are expressed in terms of
antitrust injury, they also can be seen as having the substantive impact
of making resale price maintenance effectively per se lawful. First, the
terminated dealer has suffered no antitrust injury. Second, the acqui-
escing dealer, while suffering an antitrust injury, has been damaged
only to the extent that its lost profits could not be attributed to free
138. Id.
139. 825 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
140. Id. at 1162.
141. Id. at 1164-65.
142. Precisely the same reasoning seems to apply to terminated dealers. Any profits that a
terminated dealer could have earned at the prices that would have prevailed absent the RPM
agreement would be recoverable.
143. Isaksen, 825 F.2d at 1165.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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riding. Since terminated and acquiescing dealers become unlikely chal-
lengers, the net result is that RPM becomes very close to per se legal, in
effect, a new substantive rule.
There are a number of issues raised by the Seventh Circuit's posi-
tion. First, it is internally inconsistent. The dealer who acquiesces to a
demand for RPM suffers antitrust injury to the extent it could have
profited by price cutting and making sales that were not a function of
free riding. On the other hand, the dealer who cuts prices and subse-
quently is terminated suffers no antitrust injury. The dealer is unable
to show that some of the profits that could have been made but for the
termination would not have been the result of free riding.
Second, the Seventh Circuit's position suggests an artificially nar-
row concept of antitrust injury. In the context of RPM, dealers must be
required to adhere to the price floor by the threat of termination. If
dealers are not required to adhere to the price floor by this threat, those
dealers who might be inclined to cooperate will lose sales to those who
do not comply and the whole scheme fails, much as a horizontal cartel
fails when there are too many cheaters. Thus, in Local Beauty the abil-
ity to terminate the plaintiff was a necessary step in the illegal opera-
tion. RPM cannot be successful unless the price cutter can be cut off.
The Seventh Circuit, however, separates the illegal action from the
steps required to make RPM work by declaring that the terminated
dealer has suffered no antitrust injury.
The better view, and one that is logically consistent with Isaksen,
as well as Supreme Court precedent, postulates that the terminated
dealer has suffered an antitrust injury. Its injury flows from an essential
element of a judicially declared anticompetitive scheme. Comparing Lo-
cal Beauty with Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.146 clari-
fies this point. In Brunswick the injury flowed from an increase in
competition when a powerful competitor entered the plaintiff's market.
This entrance created downward pressure on prices. 147 In Local Beauty
the injury flowed from the forced departure of a competitor. This forced
departure eliminated downward pressure on prices. 48
Local Beauty's narrow view of antitrust injury to some degree
stems from confusing antitrust injury with the ability to meet the evi-
dentiary standard with respect to damages. The court, in effect, found
that all lost profits resulted from the plaintiff not being able to free ride
on the efforts of other dealers. 49 As a factual matter, nothing is offered
146. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
147. Id. at 480-81.
148. Local Beauty, 787 F.2d at 1199.
149. Id. at 1202.
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to substantiate this presumption. In fact, it is likely that the plaintiff
would have made some sales even without the promotional efforts of
other dealers. Following Isaksen, the Local Beauty holding should have
been that the plaintiff suffered antitrust injury. The damages, however,
should have been limited to the profits that would have been earned if
the plaintiff had not been terminated and had not benefited from a free
ride on the efforts of other dealers.
The fact that the Seventh Circuit approach may be at odds with
generally accepted antitrust goals is, perhaps, its most important prob-
lem. Even the narrowest version of antitrust aims seems to accept one
of two possibilities: Enhancing consumer surplus or maximizing overall
or allocative efficiency-the sum of consumer surplus and producer sur-
plus.150 As a practical matter, the impact of RPM on these goals is an
empirical question.
For example, the standard justification for RPM is that dealers
who are unable to compete on the basis of price will increase their com-
petitive efforts in other areas such as services and advertising. 51 Obvi-
ously RPM would not be undertaken unless it enhanced producer
surplus. This observation leaves, then, the issue of the impact on con-
sumer surplus. The theory is that under the best of conditions the value
of these services to consumers exceeds the price increase caused by
RPM. Thus, both consumer surplus and overall efficiency are enhanced.
The actual impact on consumer surplus, however, is problematic.
In particular, in some instances consumer surplus may not increase;
that is, consumers may not value the extra services by as much as the
cost increase. From the point of view of those who take a consumer
oriented view of antitrust, this possibility is enough to establish that, at
least in this instance, RPM did not accord with substantive antitrust
concerns. Of course, with the decline in consumer surplus, overall effi-
ciency still may increase as long as the increase in producer surplus off-
sets the decrease in consumer surplus. The outcome will depend on the
nature of the demand for the product before and after resale price
maintenance. 152 Thus, even those who advocate allocative efficiency as
the sole goal of antitrust cannot be sure that RPM achieves this goal
nor that its per se prohibition is any less efficient than its per se
legality.
150. For a discussion of the relationship between these goals, see Brodley, The Economic
Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1020 (1987). See generally R. BORE, supra note 12, at 90-115.
151. See T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, supra note 4, at 149.
152. See generally Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints,
52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983).
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The matter is more easily seen in Figure 1.111 D1 is the demand
curve prior to RPM, and S1 is the supply curve. Before RPM, the price
is P, and the quantity bought and sold is Q. Consumer surplus is
equal to the area PAC, and producer surplus is equal to the area PCF.
RPM affects both supply and demand when it eventually is instituted.
On the supply side, dealers respond to their inability to compete on the
basis of price by offering additional services. This practice results in
increased costs of production and a shift in the supply curve from S, to
S. Buyers are likely to find the services-enhanced product more attrac-
tive, and the result is a shift in demand.
FIGURE 1
PRICE AND COST
Q1 Q2 QUANTITY
153. This graph has appeared in a variety of forms. See, e.g., T. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON,
supra note 4, at 161-64; Comanor, supra note 152; Scherer, supra note 152. This simplified version
is drawn from Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEo. L.J. 305, 318
(1987).
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In Figure 1 two possibilities are illustrated. D2 is parallel to D1,
suggesting that all consumers find the new version of the good more
attractive than the first and that its increase in attractiveness is the
same for all buyers. In essence, they all are willing to pay the same
amount in excess of what they originally were willing to pay. The result
is that quantity Q2 is bought and sold. At quantity Q2 and price P2,
consumer surplus area P2GH is greater than pre-RPM consumer sur-
plus P1AC. Similarly, producer surplus has increased from area P1CF to
area P2HJ. Thus, both consumer surplus and overall efficiency increase
with this shift in demand.15
4
Demand curve Ds depicts another possibility. The curve illustrates
demand shifting upward by different amounts for different consumers.
This shift reflects the possibility that consumers will vary in terms of
how much they value the services offered by dealers. With this particu-
lar demand curve, the equilibrium quantity also is Q2. Consumer sur-
plus, which is equal to P2AH, is, however, smaller than consumer
surplus P1AC. If this decrease in consumer surplus offsets the increase
in producer surplus, RPM enhances neither consumer surplus nor over-
all efficiency.
The Seventh Circuit's artificially narrow approach to antitrust in-
jury short-circuits the analysis and avoids the empirical question. This
approach is most likely traceable to the court's disapproval of the Su-
preme Court's implicit answer to this question found in the Supreme
Court's classification of RPM as a per se offense.1 55 Aside from the im-
portant issue of whether this classification is an appropriate way to re-
spond to a disagreement with the Supreme Court, there is as yet no
empirical justification for the Seventh Circuit's effective position of per
se legality rather than per se illegality.
C. Predatory Conduct
Predatory pricing and other forms of predatory conduct have re-
ceived a good deal of academic 56 and judicial attention since 1975.157
This attention has focused primarily on defining what constitutes pre-
dation in the context of attempts to monopolize in violation of section 2
154. In this regard it is interesting to observe that the fact that P. exceeds P, (prices have
increased) does not provide any relevant information for analyzing the welfare effects of RPM.
155. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
156. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Preda-
tion: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strate-
gic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YAL. L.J. 284 (1977).
157. For a comprehensive analysis of judicial treatment, see Liebeler, Whither Predatory
Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052 (1986).
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of the Sherman Antitrust Act.15  We are concerned, however, with iden-
tifying antitrust injury occasioned by predation. As in the case of RPM,
the problem of identifying antitrust injury in the context of predatory
conduct has no obvious solution. During the predatory campaign con-
sumers actually are better off due to low prices.15e In addition, some
antitrust scholars take the view that competitors of a firm engaged in
predatory pricing suffer no antitrust injury.160 These scholars reason
that whatever harm the competitors suffer results from price competi-
tion. This view, however, turns out to be an artificially narrow concept
of antitrust injury and one that ultimately undercuts antitrust goals.
The implications of this narrow approach can be seen most clearly
with the help of Figure 2. Figure 2 illustrates what we call "Stage I"
losses, the losses that occur during the actual period of predation. In
FIGURE 2
PRICE AND COST
QUANTITY
158. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 provides that "[elvery person who shall. . . attempt to
monopolize. . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
159. One antitrust scholar observed that any monopoly overcharge paid by consumers if the
firm eventually acquires monopoly power should be reduced by the amount of the undercharge
during the predatory period. Page, supra note 13, at 1474. The fact that two different groups of
consumers may be involved presumably is irrelevant in a deterrence-based system.
160. See, e.g., H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 165-66 (1985); Eas-
terbrook, supra note 13. But see Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's
Going, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 289, 312 (1983).
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Figure 2 the negatively sloped line D is consumer demand, and the mar-
ginal cost of the alleged predator is shown as the curve labeled MC.
When the seller sets price and output at P, and Q, respectively, the
sum of producer and consumer surplus is maximized. This junction is
the ideal price-output combination because the social value of the re-
sources used to produce the output in question is precisely equal to the
social cost of using those resources to produce that output. In Figure 2
the social value of the resources used is measured by the height of the
demand curve, and the social cost of the resources used is measured by
the height of the marginal cost curve.
Predation occurs when the predator, faced with competition, ex-
pands output to Q2 and lowers price to P2. The predator incurs losses
because the marginal cost of the incremental output exceeds consumer
valuation of that output. The value of the incremental output is mea-
sured by the area under the demand curve between Q2 and Q,. The
social cost of that incremental output is measured by the area under
the marginal cost curve between Q2 and Q, The reduction in social wel-
fare is shown as the shaded triangular area. This welfare loss is caused
by an excessive use of resources in this industry.
Antitrust concern regarding predation surfaces because predation
is thought to be a way to achieve a monopoly. Rivals are driven out of
business by the predator's below-cost pricing. The predator raises
prices above costs to the monopoly level following this exodus of rivals.
The predator then earns monopoly profits to offset the losses incurred
earlier during the period of predatory activity. The supracompetitive
prices eventually paid by consumers occur during "Stage II." There
seems to be little question that consumers have suffered antitrust injury
during Stage I. The issue in academic circles is whether the rivals of
the predatory firm have suffered antitrust injury. The issue has two ver-
sions: cases of successful predation and cases of unsuccessful predation.
1. Successful Predation
If the predation is successful and the bout of below-cost pricing by
a dominant firm drives its smaller rivals out of the industry, the mo-
nopolist raises prices to the monopoly level and restricts output appro-
priately. Although there is no doubt that those consumers who are now
being overcharged by the difference between the prepredation price and
the monopoly price have experienced antitrust injury, some argue that
the opposite is true for the excluded rivals. According to the argument,
excluded rivals are entitled to a competitive return on their investment,
but they can earn that return in other industries. 61 If the excluded ri-
161. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 263,
326-27 (1981). The owners can earn a competitive return in various endeavors when resources are
freely mobile in an economy. If actual returns fall below the competitive level in a particular in-
dustry, resources will flow out of that industry and into other occupations where a competitive
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vals make a claim for a larger sum, they want to be compensated for
lost monopoly profits.'62
This argument, however, is not general. Although it may hold when
all of the excluded firms are equally efficient, there may be in-
framarginal firms that earn profit by virtue of being more efficient in a
particular industry than in any other 6 3 Similarly, firms with no effi-
ciency advantage whose pockets are not as deep as the predatory firm
may find that they too are unable to remain in the market. 64
In short, the excluded firms may be as efficient as or even more
efficient than the firm pricing at predatory levels. In each case, the
losses arise out of a substantive violation, predatory pricing. Moreover,
their losses occur during the time when allocative inefficiency occurs.
Allocative inefficiency is one of the types of harm the antitrust laws are
designed to prevent.' The fact that this loss is an intermediate conse-
quence should not reduce its antitrust importance. The harm suffered
by these firms during Stage I is a necessary element of a successful
predatory pricing scheme. It is difficult not to regard this harm as pre-
cisely the type the antitrust laws should be interpreted to prevent. 66
2. Unsuccessful Predation
An unsuccessful predatory effort seems on first impression to pre-
sent an especially difficult problem. Suppose, for example, that a domi-
nant firm engaged in some below-cost selling with the apparent goal of
bankrupting its smaller rivals. Much to its surprise, this strategy was
unsuccessful as the smaller rivals hung in there by matching price cuts.
Recognizing that everyone was suffering losses and that there was no
prospect of victory, the dominant firm abandoned its predation. Assum-
return can be earned. If the return in one industry exceeds the competitive level and there are no
entry barriers, resources will flow into that industry, supply will expand, prices will fall, and the
return will be pushed toward the competitive level.
162. See id.
163. One scholar, in particular, recognizes this, but incorrectly describes these rents as mo-
nopoly profits because he assumes that an inframarginal victim will price above marginal cost. See
id. at 327. This, however, is not what leads to profits. The fact that price may exceed average cost
at the point where price equals marginal cost is what leads to profits. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY,
MICROECONOMICS WITH BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 220-22 (1987).
164. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 185-86 (1976); T. SULLIVAN &
H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 498 (1984).
165. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 12, at 116-29; R. PoSNER, supra note 164, at 8-18.
166. Judge Frank Easterbrook seems to disagree without qualification. See Easterbrook,
supra note 161, at 279. Professor William Page also may disagree. At one point, Page says, "[tihe
law's concern should be the allocative inefficiency produced if the predation is successful." Page,
supra note 13, at 1475. On the other hand, Page's concern may be a result of a fear that considera-
tion of this harm could lead to overdeterrence. See Page, supra note 12, at 493-94. Support for this
view can be found in P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, T 711.2c.
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ing that this was a clear attempt to monopolize the market, which vio-
lates section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, who would have suffered
antitrust injury and thereby had incentive to sue? As it turns out, it is
obvious that consumers did not suffer. In fact, consumers paid lower
prices for the product thereby enjoying greater consumer surplus and,
therefore, would have no damages and no incentive to enforce privately
the antitrust laws. One could argue that because the only effect was a
period of lower prices, no one suffered antitrust injury. 67
There remains, however, the intermediate or Stage I social loss as-
sociated with devoting too many resources to the production of this
particular good or service. This loss is the typethat virtually every anti-
trust scholar believes the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.16
The social loss results from one firm's efforts to manipulate the compet-
itive process to produce an outcome that ultimately harms consumers.
As a consequence, the legitimate competitive expectations of rivals are
violated during the predatory efforts. 16 9 Although their losses are not
measured by the general social loss, these rivals would seem to meet
any sensible antitrust injury standard in that they are the intended
targets of an anticompetitive pricing scheme.
There is another more practical reason for treating the injuries suf-
fered by the smaller rivals as an antitrust injury: if their losses are not
deemed antitrust injury, then there will be no private enforcement of
the antitrust law. Yet, as demonstrated, there are economic losses even
when the predatory effort is unsuccessful. Given the limited enforce-
ment budgets and somewhat idiosyncratic enforcement patterns 170 of
public antitrust authorities, failure to encourage private actions by
treating this intermediate loss as antitrust injury may lead to subop-
timal levels of deterrence.
D. Collusive Monopsony
The arcane term "monopsony" refers to a market situation in
which there is a single buyer. Sometimes a small group of buyers,
167. See H. HO VENKAMP, supra note 160; Easterbrook, supra note 161. Professor Hovenkamp
seems to take a somewhat different view in P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, 1 340.2b.
168. We mean this in the sense of a generalized misallocation of resources. See, e.g., R. BORK,
supra note 12; R. POSNER, supra note 164; Brodley, supra note 150.
169. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, 340.2b.
170. See generally Adams & Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1515 (1986); Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where
Are We Coming from? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Litvack, Government
Antitrust Policy: Theory Versus Practice and the Role of the Antitrust Division, 60 Thx. L. REV.
649 (1982); Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817 (1987). In Brunswick
the Supreme Court articulated the position that even an unsuccessful predatory effort can result in
antitrust injury. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 n.14 (1977).
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oligopsonists, collude with the purpose of fixing the prices they will pay
for inputs. In other words, they collude in order to reduce the price
they must pay below the price that would prevail in the absence of their
agreement. It would seem to follow logically from the arguments offered
with respect to vertical maximum price fixing, RPM, and predatory
pricing that the victim of collusive monopsony has suffered no antitrust
injury.11
The response of antitrust law to collusive monopsony is fairly clear.
For example, in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co.172 the only three sugar beet refiners in northern California
agreed among themselves to pay uniform prices for sugar beets.17 This
agreement effectively reduced the prices paid to some of the sugar beet
growers below the level that would have prevailed without the agree-
ment.17 4 The Supreme Court had no trouble finding the agreement ille-
gal: "It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination
condemned by the Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers,
and the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are
sellers, not customers or consumers.
Similarly, in National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v.
FTC 7 6 the Seventh Circuit found a buying cartel of macaroni manufac-
turers objectionable when the cartel attempted to control the price paid
for one of its primary inputs. High quality macaroni requires the use of
100 percent durum wheat.7  Crop damage created a shortage of durum
wheat. In the normal course of events such a shortage would cause the
price of durum wheat to rise. In this case, however, the manufacturers
of macaroni agreed among themselves to change their recipe and use a
blend of fifty percent durum wheat and fifty percent farina.178 This
change in the recipe reduced the quality of the final product and artifi-
cially depressed the demand for durum wheat, thereby depressing its
price.179 The Seventh Circuit found this practice to be a per se violation
171. Although we have seen no judicial or academic arguments to this effect, the argument
might go as follows: The agreement reduces the price of an input thereby reducing the colluders'
costs which, in turn, will reduce prices to consumers. Because consumers are better off, no loss in
consumer welfare has occurred and, accordingly, no antitrust injury is suffered. A recent case with
elements of this reasoning is Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures, [July-Dec.] Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1433, at 389 (Sept. 21, 1989).
172. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
173. Id. at 223.
174. Id. at 224.
175. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
176. 345 F.2d 421 (1965).
177. Id. at 424.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 426.
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of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'80
These cases may seem misguided in that parties who are able to
combine to lower prices are found to have violated the antitrust laws.
As it turns out, however, the substantive law is quite consistent with
accepted antitrust goals, and a finding that victims have not suffered an
antitrust injury would be inappropriate. The substantive basis for con-
cern is the same as with the case of a single buyer or monopsony in that
the use of buying power can result in welfare losses.'18
Figure 3, which depicts demand for an intermediate good as D and
supply of the good as S, illustrates this substantive basis for concern.
The curve marginal to the supply curve is called the marginal factor
cost curve1 82 and is labeled MFC in Figure 3. If the monopsonist ig-
FIGURE 3
PRICE AND COST
180. Id. at 427.
181. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 148-50 (2d ed. 1981).
182. The marginal factor cost curve takes into account the increase in price that must be
paid when the supply curve is positively sloped and purchases expand. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY,
supra note 163, at 375-78.
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nored the effect its purchases had on the good's price and behaved as a
competitor in the intermediate good market, then it would buy the
quantity where demand and supply were equal. This point is shown as
Q, in the graph. Because the monopsonist's purchases cause the market
price to increase, the monopsonist takes this effect into account when
making its employment decisions. As a result, it buys where the margi-
nal factor cost equals demand. Consequently, it purchases quantity Q2.
Instead of paying a price of P, for the intermediate good, it pays the
lower price on the supply curve shown as P,.
The social welfare effects of monopsony and collusive monopsony
are analogous to those of monopoly: too few resources will be em-
ployed. 8 3 At the point where supply and demand are equal, the value
of the intermediate good as measured by the demand price is equal to
the cost to society of providing that quantity as measured by the supply
price. The employment level is optimal in a social sense at this point.
But the monopsonist will not hire this number of units because it is not
privately optimal to do so. Private profit maximization will lead the
monopsonist to employ the smaller number Q2. As a result, too few re-
sources will be employed. At this point, the value of the intermediate
good, which is given by the height of the demand curve, exceeds the
social cost, which is measured by the height of the supply curve. This
result means that some social value is forgone by the restricted hiring
decision. The welfare loss is measured by the striped triangular area.
The holdings in Mandeville Island Farms and National Macaroni
Manufacturers are appropriate because welfare is reduced by collusive
monopsony. First, the abused suppliers obviously are hurt by a collusive
restraint that reduces the prices that their output commands. Second,
because the suppliers provide less of their product, the quantity of the
final good must be reduced or its quality must be reduced. Even in
cases where supply is fixed and reductions in quantity are not possible
in the short run, consumers are hurt because the producer's profits are
reduced and their response will be to reduce supply in the future. Con-
sequently, these restraints are inconsistent with consumer welfare. The
danger is that the trend toward narrow interpretations of antitrust in-
jury, which examine only the initial impact on prices, could undermine
well-founded substantive rules.18 4
183. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONoMIcs 35-37 (1985); T. SULLIVAN & J.
HARRISON, supra note 4, at 26-32.
184. The antitrust laws do not appear to forbid what may be termed "natural" monopsonies.
Natural monopsonies arise from the existence of a single buyer, where the buyer's sole participa-
tion is due to circumstances beyond the buyer's control. This result is appropriate because the
buyer cannot do much about the fact that no one else wants to buy the product in question. This is
not to say that there will be no adverse consequences for social welfare, but there is no practical
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IV. A NEw APPROACH TO ANTITRUST INJURY
Given that the current formulation of antitrust injury permits in-
terpretations, such as the Seventh Circuit's, that potentially undercut
even the most conservative of aims for antitrust law,18 5 it is important
to consider a more precise approach and one that meshes with generally
accepted antitrust goals. We propose that a party be regarded as having
suffered antitrust injury whenever the loss incurred is a necessary con-
sequence of an antitrust violation that harms consumers when it is suc-
cessful. The inquiry can be divided into two steps. First, a successful
plaintiff must show that there is a logical connection between the suc-
cess of the activity and a decrease in consumer welfare. This step may
seem unnecessary given that antitrust law is largely about consumer
welfare, but the recent Seventh Circuit experience suggests that this
focus is easily lost. Deference to Supreme Court ruling8 6 requires that
this question be answered affirmatively whenever a per se rule is at is-
sue.18 7 If the first criterion is satisfied, then a successful plaintiff must
show that the damage to the plaintiff is a necessary consequence of suc-
cessful implementation of the scheme. The plaintiff who satisfies these
two criteria has established antitrust injury. This establishment does
not mean, however, that the plaintiff necessarily has standing. Issues of
remoteness and multiple liability then would be considered in order to
complete the overall standing evaluation.
The premise for our approach to antitrust injury generally is de-
rived from the notions of Pareto optimality and superiority and Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency. 8 In welfare economics, a change from one state of re-
source allocation to another is Pareto superior if at least one party ben-
efits and no one is worse off. s 9 In a Pareto optimal state, a change
cannot be made without making at least one party worse off. A change
is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those benefiting could compensate
those who are made worse off even though no actual compensation is
made. 9 '
remedy. Collusive monopsony is another matter.
185. See supra notes 114-19, 134-45, and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part IIG.
187. The problem with deferring to the Supreme Court's catalog of per se violations is that
some of them are misguided. For example, the Albrecht rule, see supra notes 108-13 and accompa-
nying text, probably is inconsistent with most, if not all, antitrust goals. Similarly, the per se, as
opposed to rule of reason, status of RPM is hard to justify from an economic standpoint.
188. See V. PARETO, COURS D'EcoNOMIE POLITIQUE (1896); Hicks, The Foundations of Wel-
fare Economics, 49 EcoN. J. 696 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interper-
sonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939).
189. The Pareto criterion identifies improvements for society only in cases in which everyone
is better off or at least no one is made worse off.
190. The compensation principle provides a means for comparing more states of the world:
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Those who view consumer welfare as the dominant aim of antitrust
address competitive actions from a Pareto optimal standpoint. Those
who view activities that harm consumers acceptable as long as those
losses are offset by gains to producers have a Kaldor-Hicks approach. In
either instance, the beginning point is the question of impact on con-
sumer welfare.
Our proposal would be practical and effective across the spectrum
of possible antitrust violations.191 Here, however, we focus on the rela-
tively difficult cases of RPM, predatory pricing, and collusive oligop-
sony, demonstrating that each of these practices can lead to decreases
"state B is preferred to state A if, in making the move from state A to state B, the gainers can
compensate the losers such that everyone can be made better off." R. JusT, D. HUETH & A.
SCHMiTZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 34 (1982). Compensation need not actu-
ally be paid.
191. One example would be a group boycott. A boycott can be used to exclude a group of
would-be competitors. This action will injure both those who are excluded and consumers. In the
figure below, the industry demand and supply curves are labeled D and S, respectively.
PRICE AND COST
SA
P2
0 A 0, Q, QUANTITY
The supply curve is the horizontal sum of the supply curves of groups A and B, which are labeled
SA and SB" Prior to any exclusion, the competitively determined price and output are P, and Q.
Suppose that group B is successful in excluding group A from the industry. The new equality of
supply and demand occurs where SB intersects D. Consequently, the new price will be P, which
exceeds P., and the new quantity will be Q2, which is less than Q. The incentive for group B is
that their profits will increase by an amount equal to the striped area.
The anticompetitive consequence of a boycott is the exclusion of one group of suppliers. The
logical effect of that loss is the increase in price above the competitive price. Accordingly, consum-
ers have suffered antitrust injury to the extent that P2 exceeds P,. In this instance, the overcharges
to consumers equal (P2 - P)Q 2.
The excluded producers also have suffered due to the exclusion. They lose the profit that they
would have earned in the industry of choice because they must go to other industries. This is
measured in the figure by the triangular area PXY. This loss is also a direct result of the anticom-
petitive effect of the exclusion. These injuries are not duplicative.
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in consumer welfare. 19 2 In our view, any plaintiff raising such a claim
would establish the first element of antitrust injury. In the context of
RPM, there are three classes of possible plaintiffs: terminated dealers,
acquiescing dealers, and consumers. 93 Consumers who do not value ad-
ditional services appear to have suffered an antitrust injury under any
standard. But our suggestion goes further than consumers and seeks to
include any party whose injury was a required step in the path that
leads to the consumer's loss. As discussed in the context of Local
Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., s4 terminating dealers who violate
the resale price standard is a necessary part of engaging successfully in
RPM. "'95 Similarly, some instances of RPM are marked by the unwilling
acquiescence of dealers. Thus, both terminated dealers and those deal-
ers who unwillingly adhered to the scheme would have suffered an anti-
trust injury.
In the case of RPM, this approach may seem to broaden danger-
ously the scope of plaintiffs in the case of an offense whose per se status
is subject to serious question. These concerns are unwarranted. First,
the Supreme Court's recent strengthening of the Colgate doctrine'96 in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.97 and Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 98 continues to make any vertical re-
straint on price a difficult case from a plaintiff's perspective. Second,
both terminated dealers and those who acquiesced in the scheme may
find that the amount of damages does not justify the litigation effort,
especially if the Seventh Circuit's approach in Isaksen v. Vermont
Castings, Inc.'9  is widely adopted. Third, in the case of acquiescing
dealers, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that at some point they became
unwilling participants. Finally, it is important to be realistic about to-
day's per se rules in all areas. Courts, especially the Supreme Court,
increasingly are discovering ways to consider procompetitive justifica-
tions in virtually every substantive antitrust context. 00
In the case of successful predatory pricing, overcharged customers
192. The case of vertical maximum price fixing is less clear. The Supreme Court's per se
stance seems to require that one view consumer welfare as endangered. It is difficult, though, to see
how this is possible. See Page, supra note 13, at 1469-70.
193. In the case of maximum resale prices, only dealers terminated or acquiescing would
have a complaint.
194. 787 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
195. The same can be said for vertical restraints on maximum prices.
196. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
197. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
198. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
199. 825 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); see supra notes 139-
45 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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have suffered antitrust injury. Consumer welfare is reduced because
prices are higher after the predator drives its rivals out of business.
Even though the buyers are charged bargain prices during the bout of
predation, the net effect must be to their detriment if predation is to
make any sense at all. It must be true that the present value of the
losses suffered during the price war while prices were below cost is less
than the present value of the monopoly profits that will be earned dur-
ing the recoupment period. Thus, the overcharged consumers pass the
first prong of our proposed test. The second prong is just as easily satis-
fied. It must be possible to recoup the losses incurred during the price
war for predation to make any sense. The damage to the consumer is
obviously a necessary consequence of successful implementation of a
predatory pricing scheme.
Some of the excluded rivals also suffer antitrust injury. To the ex-
tent that inframarginal firms are excluded, they have suffered losses be-
cause they will earn lower returns in alternative occupations.
Inframarginal firms earn some supracompetitive profits because there is
one or more resources owned by the firm that is particularly well suited
to being employed in that particular industry. When the firm is ex-
cluded from that industry, it must go to another industry where it has
no particular advantage. 0 1 As a consequence, the firm suffers financial
loss from its exclusion. Predation already has been found to cause a
reduction in consumer welfare; therefore, it is sufficient to pass our pro-
posed test to show that the excluded firms have suffered losses.
In the case of collusive monopsony or oligopsony, our two-prong
test shows that such buying restraints impose antitrust injury upon the
abused suppliers. First, these restraints cause a reduction in consumer
welfare because they reduce the quantity available for sale or they re-
duce the quality of the final product. In either event, the consumer is
worse off. Second, because the conspiracy is aimed directly at the sup-
pliers, there is no doubt that their injury is a necessary consequence of
the restraint. Thus, the abused suppliers have suffered antitrust injury
under our proposed test.
V. CONCLUSION
We have been concerned with the possibility that substantive anti-
trust policy is becoming increasingly inconsistent and, in some in-
stances, is being emasculated by emerging interpretations of antitrust
injury. A careful examination of some recent decisions dealing with ver-
201. Even if the predatory effort fails and the inframarginal firm is not eventually excluded,
it still has suffered antitrust injury because its losses were a necessary part of a scheme that would
have harmed consumers if it had been successful.
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tical price restrictions and of the implications of these decisions for
predatory pricing and collusive oligopsony illustrates the basis for this
concern. Accordingly, we propose a two-prong test for determining the
existence of antitrust injury. First, a plaintiff must show that the action
complained of is logically connected to an adverse effect on consumers.
Second, a plaintiff must show that the injury suffered was necessary for
the original action to be successful.
When we applied this two-prong test to resale price maintenance,
predatory conduct, and collusive monopsony, we confirmed its useful-
ness. Our proposed test results in a clear and predictable method of
identifying injured parties in a way that complements antitrust goals
and avoids the danger of underdeterrence.

